

The Heyday of the Odrysian Kingdom: Cotys I, his Foreign Policy Towards Athens and the Inevitable War for the Thracian Chersonese

Asen Bondzhev

New Bulgarian University, Department of History, Sofia, BULGARIA

Received: 5 April 2025 ▪ Revised: 30 June 2025 ▪ Accepted: 7 July 2025

Abstract

Beyond the seemingly close relations with Athens, Cotys' foreign policy was deeply marked by duplicity. His main goal was the conquest of the Thracian Chersonese. He therefore sought to ensure the security of the kingdom from the north, maintaining close relations with the Triballians, the Krobyzoi and the Getae. The lack of sufficient written records suggests that Cotys I may not have been as active outside the borders of his kingdom in the 380s and 370s BC, preferring instead to stabilize his internal affairs. In the early 370s BC, Athens managed to restore its influence through the Second Athenian League, but at the beginning and towards the middle of the 360s BC the situation in the Thracian Chersonese became more complicated, because of the actions of the satraps from Asia Minor who broke away from the Persian Empire. It is then when Cotys I started his war for the strategic peninsula, needed for true political and military power.

Keywords: Odrysian kingdom, Cotys I, Thracian Chersonese.

1. Cotys I and his Foreign Policy Towards Athens

There are not much written sources about the early years of Cotys' rule. It is not clear whether he was the son of his predecessor Hebryzelmis or a Thracian aristocrat.¹ According to Harpocration (s.v. Cotys), he ruled for 24 years, which places his reign between 384/383 and 360 BC.² The beginning of his reign was marked by his being granted Athenian citizenship and "decorated with golden crowns" (Dem. 23.118), a sign of a treaty and alliance between him and Athens.³ The *close relations* (see below) between Cotys and Athens are confirmed by the marriage of his daughter to the Athenian *strategos* Iphicrates, with whose help he presumably succeeded in

¹ Porozhanov (2021: 263) suggests that Cotys might be connected to the royal house of Teres I because Cotys' grandson, Teres, was the son of Cersobleptes. Tacheva (2006: 146) thinks he might have been a paradynast (co-ruler or a governor controlling separate regions of the kingdom), without necessarily being a descendant of Teres.

² According to the only precisely datable account in Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristocrates* (163), the Athenian *strategos* Cephisodotus was sent with a fleet to the Hellespont in the autumn of 360 BC, where he learned of the king's assassination. Therefore the dating of Cotys' rule is between 384/383 and 360 BC (Tacheva, 2006: 141).

³ Fol 1975: 146; Popov, 2009: 101; Porozhanov, 2021: 263.

establishing himself as the heir of Hebryzelmis.⁴ Athenaeus (4.7) vividly describes the scene as follows:

Over the market-place were spread purple rugs down to where his pinnace lay. At the dinner were your butter-eating gentry, with unkempt hair and in countless numbers.⁵ The kettles were bronze and bigger than cellars containing a dozen beds. Cotys himself had an apron on, and brought the soup in a gold pitcher . . . And the groom, 'twas said, received as dower two droves of chestnut mares, a herd of goats, a golden sack and a wastrel cup, a pitcher of snow, a pot of millet, a bin of bulbs, twelve cubits deep, and a hecatomb of octopuses.⁶

Upon receiving Athenian citizenship, Cotys reacted so:

. . . as he understood that the Athenians had given him citizenship, made answer, that he would give them the rights of his nation. Thereby he equalled Thrace to Athens, lest by accounting himself unable to reciprocate such a benefit, he should have been considered to have thought too meanly of his origin.⁷ (Valer. Maxim. 3.7e.7)

Undoubtedly his self-confidence had reason to be so high, for he was a king of a powerful and rich Odrysian kingdom and he was not just ruling over other Thracian tribes, but was also receiving tribute from many Hellenic *poleis* on the coasts of the Thracian Sea, Sea of Marmara, and possibly Black Sea.



Figure 1. The Odrysian kingdom during the reign of Teres I and Cotys I

⁴ Fol, 1981: 223; Popov, 2011: 106; Zahrnt, 2015: 44; V. Fol, 2017: 209. Tacheva (2006: 146) does not agree that Iphicrates was involved in Cotys' ascension to power. The son of this marriage, Menestheus, became a *strategos* in 356/355 BC (Cornelius Nepos *Iphicr.* 3.4), meaning he should have been at least 30 years old at that time, according to Tacheva (2006: 143). According to Buck (1998: 155 ff), Iphicrates arrived in the Hellespont in 390 BC and in 387 BC he was not in Thrace anymore. These are the arguments why the marriage should have been prior 387 BC.

⁵ Long hair tied at the back of the head was a traditional Thracian aristocratic hairstyle. Consumption of butter distinguished "the rich from the lower orders" (Pliny 28.35).

⁶ Much of Iphicrates' prestige derived from a stunning victory at Corinth's port of Lechaenum in 390 BC, where he led a force of mercenary peltasts that destroyed an entire division of Spartan hoplites. For Iphicrates' importance as a general and his success in skillfully marshaling Thracian peltasts see Sears 2013: 273-286.

⁷ See also Plutarch (*Sayings*, 174d): "when one gave him [to Cotys] a leopard, gave him a lion for it".

But beyond the seemingly *close relations* with Athens, Cotys' foreign policy was deeply marked by duplicity. He inherited the need to maintain at least seemingly good relations with the Athenians, because from them would come the support he so lacked at crucial moments.⁸ His main wish, however, was to fulfill the great goal of the Odrysian kings before him – the conquest of the Thracian Chersonese, which would bring true political and military power. The Athenians could not allow this, as the Hellespont secured the vital for Athens's grain supply from the northern Black Sea region.⁹ One of the reasons the Athenians gave Cotys citizenship and golden crowns was probably to ensure that he would not endanger the Thracian Chersonese, and the other – to help them against Sparta. In return, the king received the right to collect tribute from the *poleis* and *emporía*.¹⁰

The lack of sufficient written records, due to the disinterest of Greek authors, could be taken as an indication that in the 380s and 370s BC Cotys was not so active outside the borders of his kingdom and preferred to stabilize the internal affairs of the state. Apparently, he had domestic enemies and challenges, because he had to suppress an uprising of one Adamas, a prominent aristocrat, who rioted because he had been mutilated by Cotys when a boy (Arist. *Pol.* 1311b); but the riot was local and quickly put down.¹¹

2. Preparations for a future war

It could be assumed that Cotys made preparations for a future war with Athens from the very first years of his rule. He therefore sought to ensure the security of the kingdom from the north, maintaining close relations with the Triballians, the Krobyzoi and the Getae. This is attested by the royal gifts, *phiales*, with the name of Cotys inscribed on them, found in three different locations hundreds of kilometers apart: in Vratsa (Bulgaria) – territory of the Triballians; Aleksandrovo (Lovetch) – the Krobyzoi; Adzhigiyol (Tulcea, Romania) – the Getae.¹² Once his rear was secured, he could have advanced to the south.

⁸ Fol, 1981: 222.

⁹ See Worthington, 2014: 57.

¹⁰ Popov, 2009: 106. Despite the lack of direct sources indicating the amount of tribute collected by Cotys, Kalin Porozhanov (2021: 278-280) tried to calculate it. It is known from Demosthenes (23.110) that Cotys' son Cersobleptes received as tribute 30 talents (1 talent = c. 26 kg of pure silver) from Chersonese and 200 talents from the ports. But that amount did not include all other *poleis* and *emporía* (i.e. on the Black Sea coast), neither the tribute from the subjugated Thracians and would not be indicative for the whole territory of the Odrysian kingdom during the reign of Sitalces (444–424 BC), Seuthes I (424–405 BC), etc. until Cotys I, but for only 1/3 to 1/2 of the divided into three unequal parts Odrysian state. This information allows a reasonable speculation of the amount of tribute received by Cotys: if 200 talents is multiplied by 2 or 3, that would equal 400 or 600 talents. The minimum sum of 400 talents, received as tribute from Seuthes I, is well known from Thucydides (2.97.3). However, this sum includes taxes from the subjugated Thracians. If to these 400 or 600 talents we add the 30 talents from Chersonese, add the tribute from the larger *poleis* and the Thracian tribes, the amount received by Cotys I would likely significantly exceed 1000 talents. The thousand talents reported by Diodorus (12.50.2) represent the tribute collected by Sitalces from both the *poleis* and the Thracians. But under Cotys I the power and the role of his kingdom in international political life were even greater and more crucial for Athens and its interests in the Thracian southeastern territories and the Hellespont, so it would be reasonable to expect this amount to be higher.

¹¹ Popov, 2009: 107.

¹² Venedikov, 1972: 1-2. Porozhanov, 2021: 269.



Figure 2. Phiale with the name of Cotys I, produced in his residence in Beos.
Found in the Mogilan(ska) mound, Vratsa

In 376/375 BC, 30 000 Triballians attacked Abdera:

... and after seizing a large quantity of booty they were making their way homeward in a contemptuous and disorderly fashion when the inhabitants of Abdera took the field in full force against them and slew more than two thousand of them as they straggled in disorder homewards. The barbarians then, enraged at what had happened and wishing to avenge themselves upon the Abderites, again invaded their land. The victors in the earlier conflict, being elated by their success and aided by the presence of the *Thracians of the neighboring region*, who had sent out a body of men to assist them, drew up their lines opposite to the barbarians. A stubborn battle took place, and since the Thracians suddenly changed sides, the Abderites, now left to fight alone and surrounded by the superior number of the barbarians, were butchered almost to a man, as many as took part in the fight. (Diod. 15.36.1-3)

According to A. Höck, the *Thracians of the neighboring region* could have been none other than Cotys' Odrysians.¹³ And although not sure whether this event was pre-planned, it weakened an important *polis* in Cotys' expansionistic plan.

¹³ Höck, 1904: 266-268. Porozhanov, 2021: 268.



Figure 3. Fortress-residences (tyrseis) of the Thracian kings and Hellenic poleis on the Thracian Sea, Sea of Marmara and Black Sea, 5th – middle of 4th century BC. Adapted after Porozhanov 2021: 368 (cf. Porozhanov 2009)

One of the early issues of bronze coins of Cotys I was undoubtedly made in the mint of Maroneia. Their minting is believed to have been in the early years of his reign and is a material expression of the very close political relationship between the *polis* and the king,¹⁴ in spite of the fact that Maroneia was already a member of the Second Athenian League (established in 377 BC). In very close proximity to Maroneia were located several important military facilities: the Thracian royal-residences Ismarus and Serrion Teichos,¹⁵ and the *emporion* with royal-residence Zone. It is reasonable to assume that Cotys would also try to impose himself over the western side of the bay, where the other great Hellenic *polis* taxed by his predecessors, Abdera, was. In such a case, the theory of premeditation in the weakening of Abdera by withdrawing of the *Thracians of the neighboring region* from the battle, is given additional weight.



Figure 4. Cotys I, silver obol (1.03 g). Paunov, 2015: 282

Between 377 and 375 BC Athens managed to restore its influence through the Second Athenian League, joined by Byzanthion, Perinthos, Maroneia, Abdera, Ainos, Dikaia, the islands

¹⁴ Tacheva, 2006: 163; Porozhanov, 2021: 267-268.

¹⁵ Cf. Porozhanov, 2009.

of Samothrace and Thasos with their mainland territories, Elaios, Selymbria, Neapolis, etc. But the political situation changed in 371 BC when Thebes defeated Sparta in the Battle of Leuctra and challenged Athens. Benefiting from the weakness and disorder in the Greek world, Cotys used deception against Perinthus, which was among the members of the League:

Cotys of Thrace asked the people of Perinthus for a loan to enable him to raise an army. On their refusing, he begged them at any rate to let him have some of their citizens to garrison certain fortresses, and release for active service the men who were there on duty. They readily complied, thinking thus to obtain control of the fortresses. But Cotys placed in custody the men they sent, and told the citizens that they might have them back when they had sent him the amount of the loan he desired. ([Ps.] Arist. *Econ.* 1351a)

Apparently Cotys had no scruples about taking forcibly, if denied a voluntary “loan”, which he needed for his forthcoming military campaign.

3. The war for the Thracian Chersonese

At the beginning and towards the middle of the 360s BC the situation in the Thracian Chersonese became more complicated, because of the actions of the satraps from Asia Minor who broke away from the Persian Empire. In 367 BC Ariobarzanes, the Persian satrap of Phrygia (368–362 BC), occupied Sestos. Following Ariobarzanes’ revolt against the Persian king Artaxerxes II in 365 BC, Cotys tried to use the situation and invaded the Thracian Chersonese, violating the his agreements with Athens. He conquered Kardia,¹⁶ but the siege of Sestos failed. Unable to overcome the joint Persian and Athenian forces, he marched west towards the Chalcidice Peninsula to expand his kingdom’s boundaries. The likelihood of success of that initiative was not slim due to the disagreements and struggles for the Macedonian throne. Cotys was joined by his son-in-law, the dismissed Athenian general Iphicrates, who most probably informed him about the current political events in the Macedonian royal court. In Chalcidice, the Odrysian king declared himself an ally of Olynthus and the local *poleis* against Athens, joining forces with a new ally – the mercenary commander Charidemus, a pupil of Iphicrates, who married another daughter of Cotys. The details of the war are unfortunately not well known. Eventually neither side could get advantage and Cotys stepped back.

In 362 BC Cotys conquered the majority of the Thracian Chersonese without Elaeus, Sestos and Crithote, owned by Athens (Dem. 23.158). At the same time Miltokythes, probably his treasurer, revolted and conquered Hieron Oros, where the royal treasury was and offered Athens to “restore the Chersonese” (Dem. 23.104; 50.5). In 362/361 BC Athens decided to help him by sending the *strategos* Autocles. Parallel to Miltokythes’ plea, a letter from Cotys arrived (Dem. 23.115). Its contents are unknown, but it can be assumed that, like Miltokythes, the king also proposed some solution to the conflict in Chersonese. This seems to have been the reason for the dual policy of Athens, trying both to support Miltokythes but not to oppose Cotys directly. Apparently Athens took a decision that was interpreted by the rebel as a refusal to support him, and he surrendered to Cotys in the spring of 361 BC.¹⁷

After the suppression of the rebellion, Cotys’ continued his full-scale attacks in the Chersonese. The subsequent *strategoi* in the Hellespont, Menon (only for a few weeks after Autocles) and Timomachus in 361/360 BC, were put on trial, for gross mistakes during their command (Dem. 19.180, 36.53, Dem. 50.12, 14). In late 361 – early 360 BC Cotys conquered Sestos

¹⁶ Dem. 23.149-152; Tzvetkova, 2008: 197; Porozhanov, 2021: 270-271.

¹⁷ Dem. 23.104. Fol, 1974: 1005; Heskell, 1997: 77; Tzvetkova, 2008: 200.

with the help of the opposite Asia Minor city of Abydos and Iphicrates.¹⁸ Iphicrates, however, refused to attack the last two Athenian strongholds, Crithote and Elaeus, and withdrew to the island of Lesbos, and later to Drys.

In September 360 BC Iphicrates was replaced by Charidemus, who besieged Crithote and Elaeus, and, according to the letters of their governors, it was only a matter of time before they fell.¹⁹ Athens dispatched to the Hellespont a new *strategos*, Charidemus' friend Cephisodotus. By the time he arrived in the last week of September 360 BC, Cotys had been murdered by two brothers from Ainos, Python and Heraclides.²⁰ Thought previously to be close to the king, they murdered him during a feast in his palace, in order to avenge their father.²¹ Upon their return to Athens, they were granted citizenship and rewarded with gold wreaths. When Python was admired and honored by the Athenians for slaying Cotys, he said "God did this, borrowing from me the hand that did the deed" (Plut. *Precepts of Statecraft*, 20.816e).²²

The death of Cotys marked the beginning of the kingdom's downfall. The Odrysian state was divided among three competing kings (Dem. 23.8). Cersobleptes, the son of Cotys, ruled the easternmost parts beyond the lower Hebros and Tonzos. Amadocus II, perhaps a son of Amadocus I, took the mountainous hinterland of Maroneia. Berisades established himself in the area around the lower Nestos.²³ The division of Odrysian Thrace was exploited by Philip II of Macedon to impose his control over the area.

4. Conclusion

Cotys I ruled for 24 years. Initially a friend of Athens, he later turned into its most dangerous enemy and will be remembered as a tireless military commander, a hypocritical diplomat and a severe ruler.²⁴ Athens' goal was to keep its both Balkan adversaries, Thrace and Macedonia, weak, but achieved that only with Thrace. Demosthenes formulated the Athenian policy regarding the Thracian Chersonese – the peninsula would be best defended by having weak Thracian kings with constant conflicts with each other. The assassination of Cotys not only

¹⁸ Dem. 23.158-160. Tzvetkova, 2008: 201.

¹⁹ Dem. 23.132, 152-162. Fol, 1975: 157; Tzvetkova, 2008: 201-202.

²⁰ The death of Cotys has been placed in 359 BC by those who interpret Theopompus' (Fr. 31 = Athen. 12.42) account as a meeting between Philip II and Cotys in the Thracian royal residence Onocarsis (Höck, 1891: 99-100; Fol, 1975: 159; Ellis, 1976: 49; Yordanov, 1998: 14-15), preceding by a letter of Cotys to Philip (6.53). But more convincing seems to be the dating in 360 BC, before the arrival of Cephisodotus in the Hellespont (Dem. 23.163; Tonev, 1942: 200; Danov, 1970: 45; Badian, 1983: 52; Heskell, 1997: 56-60; Tacheva, 2006: 141; Tzvetkova, 2008: 193).

²¹ The reason provided by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311b 21-22), vengeance, is accepted as historical by Höck, 1904: 269; Kahrstedt, 1922: 1552; Wörle, 1981: 156-157; Trampedach, 1994: 90-92; Schütrumpf and Gehrke 1996: 560. An involvement of Athens is supposed by Fol, 1974: 1005; Dušanić, 1980: 122; Jordanov, 1996: 224-225; Delev, 1997: 7; Archibald, 1998: 221; Tzvetkova, 2008: 202; Popov, 2011: 112; V. Fol, 2017: 221; Porozhanov, 2021: 276. *Contra* Wörle, 1981: 156-157; Trampedach, 1994: 90-92; Schütrumpf and Gehrke 1996: 560; Tacheva, 2006: 159. See Zaccaria, 2019: 77-78. A possibility of Miltokythes' involvement in the assassination is expressed by Badian (1983: 54, n. 10).

²² Plutarch (*Laud.* 11.542e-f, *Col.* 32.1126c) and Philostratus (*Life of Apol.* 7.2-3) even interpreted Python's and Heraclides' heroic deed in the light of their Academic education (a particular which is absent in the most ancient sources). Wörle 1981: 157-158; Trampedach 1994: 90-92; Schütrumpf & Gehrke 1996: 560 assume that the philosophical motivation and the brothers' affiliation with the Academy may have been later constructions. See Zaccaria 2019: 78.

²³ Cf. Worthington, 2014: 40.

²⁴ On the personality of Cotys in ancient sources see Kotova, 2014.

accomplished it, but strengthened Philip's position and that was one of the main factors that prepared and facilitated his later victories.

Acknowledgements

This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

The author declares no competing interests.

References

- Archibald, Z. (1998). *The Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace. Orpheus Unmasked*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Badian, E. (1983). Philip II and Thrace. *Pulpudeva*, 4, 51–71.
- Buck, R. (1998). *Thrasybulus and the Athenian democracy: The life of an Athenian Statesman*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag (Historia Einzelschriften 120).
- Danov, C. (1970). On the foreign policy of Macedonia, Thrace and Greece in the 4th and early 3rd centuries BC [Към външната политика на Македония, Тракия и Гърция през IV и в началото на III в. пр. н. е.]. In *Studia Balcanica 2. Prouchvania po sluchai II kongres po balkanistika*. Sofia, 33–54.
- Delev, P. (1997). Philip II and the decline of the “Large” Odrysian Kingdom in Thrace [Филип II и зализът на „голямото“ Одриско царство в Тракия]. In *Trudove na katedrite po istoriya i bogoslovie pri Shumenskiya universitet “Episkop Konstaktin Preslavski”*, 1. Shumen: Antos, 7–40.
- Delev, P. (2015). Thrace from the assassination of Kotys I to Koroupedion (360–281 BC). In J. Valeva, E. Nankov & D. Graninger (Eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Thrace*. Wiley-Blackwell, 48–58.
- Dušanić, S. (1980). Plato's Academy and Timotheus' Policy, 365–359 BC. *Chiron* 10, 111–144.
- Ellis, J. (1976). *Philip II and Macedonian imperialism*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Fol, A. (1972). *Political history of the Thracians. Late second millennium to late fifth century BC*. [Политическа история на траките. Края на второто хилядолетие до края на пети век преди новата ера.]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo.
- Fol, A. (1974). Die Politik des odrysischen Königs Kotys I und die ägäischen Städte Griechenlands im 4. Jahrhundert v. u. Z. In E. Welskopf (ed.), *Hellenische Poleis, Krise–Wandlung–Wirkung, Volume 2*. Berlin, 993–1014.
- Fol, A. (1975). *Thrace and the Balkans in the early hellenistic age* [Тракия и Балканите през ранноелинистическата епоха]. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo.
- Fol, A. (1981) [2014]. *History of the Bulgarian lands in Ancient times* [История на българските земи в древността]. Sofia: Tangra TanNakRa.
- Fol, V. (2017). Cotys I [Котис I]. In V. Fol, D. Popov & K. Yordanov (Eds.), *Tsarete na trakite*. Sofia: Tangra TanNakRa, 209–222.
- Heskel, J. (1997). *The north Aegean wars, 371–360 B.C.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag (Historia Einzelschriften 102).
- Höck, A. (1891). Das Odryssenreich in Thrakien im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert v. Chr. *Hermes*, 26, 76–117.
- Höck, A. (1904). Zur Geschichte des Thrakerkönigs Kotys I. *Klio*, 4, 265–269.

- Jordanov, K. (1996). The political history of the Odrysian Kingdom 359-339 BC. In J. Bouzek, M. Domaradzki & Z. Archibald (Eds.), *Pistiros I. Excavations and Studies*. Prague, 223–240.
- Kahrstedt, U. (1922). Kotys (2). *Realencyclopädie XI/2*, 1551–1555.
- Kotova, D. (2014). The personality of Kotys in the ancient literary tradition. In S. Yanakieva, R. Georgieva & R. Popova, *Orpheus 21. Journal of Indo-European and Thracian Studies*. Sofia: Institute of Balkan Studies & Centre of Traceology Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 37–62.
- Paunov, E. (2015). Introduction to the numismatics of Thrace, ca. 530 BCE–46 CE. In J. Valeva, E. Nankov & D. Graninger (Eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Thrace*. Wiley-Blackwell, 265–292.
- Popov, D. (2009). *Ancient Thrace. History and culture* [Древна Тракия. История и култура]. Sofia: LIK.
- Popov, D. (2011). *Thracians* [Траки]. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad.
- Porozhanov, K. (2009). The residences of the Odrysian rulers. In K. Porozhanov, K. Jorvanov & V. Fol (Eds.), *Thracia 18* (In Memory of Alexander Fol). Sofia: Institute of Balkan Studies and Centre of Thracology, 255–270.
- Porozhanov, K. (2021). The Odrysian Kingdom, the *Poleis* along its coasts and Athens from the end of the 6th century until 341 BC [Одриското царство, полисите по неговите крайбрежия и Атина от края на VI век до края на 341 г. пр. Хр]. Sofia: Ral-Kolobar.
- Schütrumpf, E., & Gehrke, H. (1996) (Eds.). *Aristoteles, Politik. Buch IV–VI*. Darmstadt: De Gruyter Akademie Forschung.
- Sears, M. (2013). *Athens, Thrace, and the shaping of Athenian leadership*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tacheva, M. (2006). *The kings of ancient Thrace. Book One* [Царете на Древна Тракия. Книга първа]. Sofia: Agató.
- Tonev, M. (1942). *Contributions to the history of the Thracians* [Приноси към историята на траките]. *Belomorski pregled*, 1, 179–228.
- Trampedach, K. (1994). *Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenössische Politik*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner (Hermes-Einzelschriften 66).
- Tzvetkova, J. (2008). *History of the Thracian Chersonese (From the Trojan war until the time of the Roman conquest)* [История на Тракийския Херсонес (от Троянската война до времето на римското завоевание)]. Veliko Tarnovo: Faber.
- Venedikov, I. (1972). The inscriptions on the Thracian phiales [Надписите върху тракийските фиали]. *Arheologia*, 2, 1–7.
- Wörle, A. (1981). *Die politische Tätigkeit der Schüler Platons*. Darmstadt: Kümmerle.
- Worthington, I. (2014). *By the Spear. Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the rise and fall of the Macedonian Empire*. Oxford University Press.
- Yordanov, K. (1998). *Political relations between Macedonia and the Thracian states (359–281 BC)* [Политическите отношения между Македония и тракийските държави (359–281 г. пр.Хр.]. Sofia: Izdatelstvo RAL–Kolobar (Studia Thracica 7).
- Zaccaria, P. (2019). The murderers of Kotys the Thracian: From Demosthenes to Diogenes Laertios. *Mnemosyne*, 72(1), 66–83.
- Zahrnt, M. (2015). Early history of Thrace to the murder of Kotys I (360 BCE). In J. Valeva, E. Nankov & D. Graninger (Eds.), *A Companion to Ancient Thrace*. Wiley-Blackwell, 35–47.

